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Background: Despite their shared origins, medicine and dentistry are not always two sides of the same coin. There
is a long history in medical philosophy of defining disease and various medical models have come into existence.
Hitherto, little philosophical and phenomenological work has been done considering dental caries and periodontitis
as examples of disease and illness.
Methods: A philosophical methodology is employed to explore how we might define dental caries and
periodontitis using classical medical models of disease – the naturalistic and normativist. We identify shared threads
and highlight how the features of these highly prevalent dental diseases prevent them fitting in either definition.
The article describes phenomenology and the current thought around the phenomenology of illness, exploring
how and why these dental illnesses might integrate into a phenomenological model.
Results: We discover that there are some features particular to dental caries and periodontitis: ubiquity,
preventability and hyper-monitorablility. Understanding the differences that these dental diseases have compared
to many other classically studied diseases leads us to ethical questions concerning how we might manage those
who have symptoms and seek treatment. As dental caries and periodontitis are common, preventable and hyper-
monitorable, it is suggested that these features affect the phenomenology of these illnesses. For example, if we
experience dental illness when we have consciously made decisions that have led to it, do we experience them
differently to those rarer illnesses that we cannot expect? Other diseases share these features are discussed.
Conclusions: This paper highlights the central differences between the classical philosophical notion of disease in
medicine and the dental examples of caries and periodontitis. It suggests that a philosophical method of
conceptualising medical illness - phenomenology - should not be applied to these dental illnesses without thought.
A phenomenological analysis of any dental illness is yet to be done and this paper highlights why a separate strand
of phenomenology should be explored, instead of employing those that are extant. The article concludes with
suggestions for further research into the nascent field of the phenomenology of dental illness and aims to act as a
springboard to expose the dental sphere to this philosophical method of analysis.
Keywords: Dentistry, Caries, Periodontitis, Disease, Illness, Naturalist, Normativist, Phenomenology, Philosophy,
Prevention
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Introduction
Our definitions of disease and illness are constantly in
flux. From Epicurus to Cooper, scientists and philoso-
phers have argued about how disease and illness can be
conceptualised [1, 2]. In the clinical dental sphere, the
discourse surrounding dental disease is, for the most
part, naturalistic and pathophysiological - with a selec-
tion of practitioners favouring a microbiological stance
[3–5]. This method of understanding disease aligns with
the first microbiological theories presented in dentistry
and the work of naturalist philosopher Christopher
Boorse, who considers health and disease to be entirely
biological, value-free notions – his Biostatistical Theory
(BST) [6, 7]. Normativists, such as Cooper [2], posit that
disease is a sociocultural phenomenon and is value-
laden. A plethora of other accounts – hybrid theories -
have sprung into existence that span the two camps.
Despite this, there are various threads connect these
extant models.
In considering illness, phenomenology – a branch of
philosophy concerned with human lived experience –
has been helpful in providing a philosophical framework
for understanding its experience. Phenomenologists such
as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have explored in detail
how people experience their world and body; Carel,
Toombs and Leder, amongst others, have explored how
illness affects this lived experience [8–11]. Many areas of
medicine have ongoing phenomenological debates where
the experience of illness is discussed - for example, old
age, suffering, mental illness [12] - however, whilst the
literature on phenomenology of illness is growing, there
exists a lacuna: the phenomenology of dental illness.
Whilst much work has been done to understand the
anatomical, physiological, pathological and socioecono-
mical features of medical and dental disease and illness,
little attention has been given to how the nature of the
two might differ. Central to this article are dental caries
and periodontitis, the most commonly managed diseases
of the primary care dentist. Dental caries, is the dental
term referring to tooth decay in any of its forms. Peri-
odontitis or, colloquially, gum disease, is the chronic
inflammation of the gums causing destruction of the
bony support of the teeth resulting in tooth movement
and loss. The intuitive and easy trap to fall into, as also
recognised by Holden and others [13], is that medicine
and dentistry have shared origins and, as such, their sub-
ject matter can be subject to the same analyses.
The first section of this article will outline, and give
examples of, the principal notions of naturalist and nor-
mativist definitions of disease and draw out connecting
threads between them. Section two will reveal how den-
tal caries and periodontitis do not comfortably fit into
any camp, given the central properties that separate
them from many other medical diseases as separate to
the above dental diseases. The end of the section con-
siders other diseases that the present analysis may apply
to and how advancements in technology and medical
techniques might widen this group of diseases. The final
section provides an outline of phenomenology and the
phenomenology of illness. It discusses the capacity for
the phenomenological exploration of these dental ill-
nesses as distinct from general medical illness. The art-
icle concludes with suggestions for further work using
existing phenomenological frameworks in an attempt to
serve as a conduit into the nascent field of the phenom-
enology of dentistry.
Naturalism and Normativism
Boorse claims that a disease is an individual’s altered
internal state leading to an ‘impairment of normal
functional ability [ … ] below a typical efficiency’:
where normal function is based on what is statisti-
cally typical for the individual within a reference
class [7]. A Boorsian reference class is defined as a
‘class of organisms of uniform functional design; spe-
cifically an age group or a sex of a species’ [7]. In
essence, irrespective of how I view myself, if I am
not functioning as well as the other humans in my
peer group, I am diseased.
One of the many challenges to this view is how wide-
spread diseases fit in. A common counterexample is that
of dental caries [2, 14]. Boorse himself notes this as be-
ing a counterexample. However, he explains that, given
that so few examples of these highly prevalent diseases
are identified (tooth decay and lung irritation), we
should not ‘bifurcate’ the definition [15]. As such, he
goes on to explain that tooth decay is normal [15].
Within the wide reference class of the United Kingdom,
just over a third of adults – still a minority - had obvious
dental decay in the most recent Adult Dental Health
Survey (ADHS) [16]. It is unclear how a minority of
people with a highly prevalent pathology can be consid-
ered to be normal as well as the other two-thirds of
people without tooth decay present. Whilst it is not the
purpose of this section to provide a review of all the crit-
icisms levelled at Boorse’s conceptualisation of disease,
the above example, dozens of other criticisms and two
rebuttals spanning more than 35 years suggest that the
Boorsian BST is not watertight [15, 17].
Normativists challenge a biostatistical conception of
disease and dispense with value-free judgements. Cooper
posited that disease is a normative phenomenon and
must be conceptualised with strong sociocultural consid-
erations [2]. Despite this significant difference, both the
naturalist and the normativist notions of disease have
parallels. They share a similar idea of reference classes.
King [18] presents his ideas of ‘statistical norms’, Cooper
highlights that a diseased individual is defined as being
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‘roughly worse off than the majority of humans of the
same sex and age’ [2] – with this, she introduces the
idea of the afflicted person being unlucky. She con-
tinues to explain that the disease must be a bad
thing to have and have potential medical treatment
available [2]. Under the normativist characterisation,
we have the ability to make value judgements on our
own pathologies when considering if an individual in
our community is diseased – society, not biology, is
judge and jury.
Theories that aim to combine the above have ap-
peared [19, 20]. Ereshefsky controversially suggested
we should do away with the terms ‘health’ and ‘dis-
ease’ in technical discussion [19]. It is not within the
scope of this article to expand on all extant accounts
of health, illness and disease, however, what is im-
portant is that most of them share a recognition of
reference classes and the relative rarity of disease
with, some recognising the undesirability of disease.
That disease is relatively rare and undesirable
seems intuitive given that diseases and illnesses are
not synchronically thought to be something that all
people have, expect to have, or are content with hav-
ing. Almost all of us will eventually die of some dis-
ease and, diachronically speaking, should expect to
become afflicted with disease as we enter old age.1
However, apart from this, we anticipate and desire to
live in good health.2
The Dental Anomaly
We have seen how, even within two extremely distinct
accounts of disease, disease is some pathology that is a
variation from the majority that may cause some harm
to life and, in some accounts, is considered problem-
atic to have. It follows that if disease befalls the minor-
ity and causes disruption, I do not expect to become
diseased today - although I would expect to encounter
disease when considering my life as a whole.
Dental caries and periodontitis occupy an interesting
niche here; they are near ubiquitous in some form. In
the United Kingdom, 90% of adults have some mani-
festation of the above [16]. It is also almost entirely
preventable and hyper-monitorable – that is to say,
there are sensitive, quick, simple and non-invasive tests
to find these pathologies, even in their early stages.3 If
a set of diseases are near ubiquitous, they cannot be
said to be rare; if they are preventable and hyper-
monitorable, they cannot be said to be unexpected. If
dental caries and periodontitis do not share the basic
tenets of many other medical diseases, how useful can
applying these notions be when considering the dental
discourse?
Boorse, using his BST, would explain the above by say-
ing that these dental diseases are simply not diseases. He
may point out that the reference classes shift such that
only severe dental decay causing unbearable pain or ad-
vanced periodontitis causing tooth movement and loss
are diseases. This seems counterintuitive: if I was diag-
nosed with mild periodontitis and tooth decay, even if it
were subclinical, I would certainly consider myself to
have a disease and accept treatment or change my life-
style and habits accordingly. Indeed, if the condition was
dismissed as health and no amends made, the progres-
sive nature of caries would mean that the severe symp-
toms would soon enough present. That we know what
constitutes a disease and if, when or how it should be
treated is extremely important for the ethics of any med-
ical profession, therefore, it is not pragmatic to simply
re-label those with dental pathology as ‘not diseased’
when many of the same people may want to seek treat-
ment to remove or ameliorate their pathology.
It might be the case that dental illness is best taken
normativistically. Would, then, my above intuition that I
am diseased and my concern for my subclinical dental
pathologies be justified and, thus, classified as a disease?
On the surface, it would seem so. I’d certainly consider
my lot to be bad and would seek potential medical treat-
ment but it is not entirely clear I could consider myself
unlucky. Preventability and monitorability are crucial
here.
Prevention and monitoring of dental disease
Cooper explains that we can only ‘consider someone to
be diseased if they could reasonably have hoped to have
been otherwise’ [2]. If a group of diseases are prevent-
able, for the most part, it is lifestyle factors that lead to
them. It is ultimately my decision to eat a diet high in
sugars and ultimately my decision to conduct a poor oral
hygiene regime. Given the above, it cannot be the case
1With the exception of those who die traumatically, due to accident.
See [21] for an exposition of synchrony and diachrony in illness – the
former referring to a point in time in one’s life and the latter to the
entirety of one’s life.
2Of course, there will be minor ailments that we come across with
relative regularity: a cold or a papercut. These afflictions are
undesirable and expected to occur occasionally, however, they are
fleeting – with a natural history of between hours or a few days - and
commonly leave no signs or symptoms.
3A note must be made here that there are factors out of one’s control
that influence the rate of dental caries and periodontitis. For example,
a person with a genetic predisposition to aggressive periodontitis living
in a place where access to tools to maintain excellent oral hygiene are
not available would not be able to prevent periodontitis. Equally, child
with a congenitally low salivation rate who is put to bed with drinks
high in sugar may not be able to prevent dental caries. However, it is
physically, if not logistically, possible to successfully prevent nearly all
of the cases of these pathologies, especially with consistent and close
aid by a dentist.
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that it is unlucky for me to experience a disease that
these high-risk behaviours lead to. Cooper clarifies that
her definition of unluckiness is as being ‘judged by the
uninformed layman’ and not medical science but there
must be an extent to which this layman is uninformed.
The notion of taking care of one’s dental health is not
esoteric – it is widespread knowledge that maintaining
good oral hygiene and a low sugar diet and so on lead to
good oral health. Thus, one cannot be reasonably consid-
ered unlucky to develop dental caries or periodontitis.4
An exception must be made of those with concomitant
or congenital disease that prevent prevention, for ex-
ample, Parkinsonian patients with dyskinesia – the im-
pairment of voluntary movement. This cohort classically
find it difficult or impossible to carry out the highly dex-
trous task of brushing their teeth. In this case, I put for-
ward that a primary disease that falls into the normal
medical conceptualisation of disease applies here and
the preventable dental disease becomes secondary, a
sequela of the primary.
It could be argued that we do not know the status of
our bodies at all times and, as such, how can we guide
the prevention of disease? I might live my life exercising
each day and eating healthily in the attempt to stave off
angina and heart attack but I cannot ask my general
practitioner (GP) to continuously measure the levels of
atherosclerotic plaques in my arteries.5 If we followed
the guidance of every public health campaign, we might
try to engage in a perfectly abstemious life, purely in the
hope that no disease befalls us but this is impractical
and a realistic balance must be achieved. This is where
the monitorability of caries and periodontitis become
important. Modern dentistry has the capacity to make a
direct assessment of the presence of these dental path-
ologies in any area of the mouth in a matter of minutes
and in a non-invasive manner. For example, a dentist
can probe the gums with specialised yet simple tools and
assess presence of periodontitis with no ill-effect to the
patient. It is relatively easy to prevent and know you are
effectively preventing dental disease.
In summary, if I act in a way that is detrimental to my
oral health and make no attempt to discover any of the
dental pathologies described – or, indeed, choose to
ignore the diagnoses when they are made - I cannot be
considered to be unlucky to have these diseases. It
follows, then, that normativist conceptions of the dental
diseases in question do not fit. In combination with how
the ubiquity of these dental pathologies prevent a natur-
alistic definition being used for dental disease – how can
we have meaningful philosophical discussion of these
dental diseases?
Lifestyle disease and the future
Though this article puts dental caries and periodontitis
in the spotlight, it is unclear that there is anything inher-
ent to these pathologies themselves that results in them
being the only ubiquitous, monitorable and preventable
diseases to which this analysis might apply. Examples
such as Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM), smoking-
related diseases and some sexually-transmitted diseases
are also eminently preventable with various lifestyle
changes. Dermatological diseases such as acne or eczema
are equally, if not more, monitorable than dental caries
and indeed various forms of allergy are extremely com-
mon. There may also be diseases that share all of these
characteristics.
We must also consider here the influence of future
technologies and discoveries on body monitoring and
disease prevention. For example, there is no inherent
characteristic of dental caries that makes it monitorable.
It is simply that the ease of non-invasive access and
current scientific knowledge and technology allow it to
be. Advancements in the future might provide equally
simple direct monitoring of other preventable pathology.
The example used above may apply: the monitoring of
atherosclerotic plaques in my arteries. If this could be
cheaply and efficiently quantified, tailored advice on life-
style change and personalised treatments might be easily
given. In this case, the current analysis being expounded
for dental caries and periodontitis may also apply to those
diseases.6 It is not within the scope of the article to delve
deeper into each of these examples but there is further
work to be done considering if and how other diseases
and pathologies share these three central characteristics.
Phenomenology of Dental Illness
We have seen how dental caries and periodontitis do
not fit definitions of classical medical disease. If we find
it difficult to settle on what is and is not a disease, prag-
matic, financial and ethical questions arise around how
we might diagnose, treat and manage those who have
symptoms and seek treatment. There are clear moral
and ethical quandaries here; are we under-treating or
over-medicalising? How can we navigate this issue?
Although phenomenology is not a method of defining
disease, phenomenologists of illness argue that even with
4One might posit that being born into or living in an environment that
cultures these diseases is unlucky and this justifies the normativist’s
condition. However, this unluckiness is not a feature of the disease, in
the same way one might consider a stroke to be unlucky. The unlucky
status is a misfortune that affects one’s life globally and has a cascade
of effects – some of which might lead to manifestation of disease. The
normativistic ‘unluckiness’ concerns that situation where disease
manifests contra sociocultural expectations.
5Although surrogate markers do exist, e.g. blood pressure, they are not
perfect, direct measures of the internal pathologies.
6I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of
this article for this point of qualification.
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sound definitions of disease (whether naturalist, norma-
tivistic or hybrid), it is not sufficient to understand the
illness experience. In a situation where these definitions
fall short – as presented above with caries and periodon-
titis – we might look to other methods of understanding
this experience. As such, I suggest a phenomenological
analysis of these dental diseases, considering them as
dental illnesses, specifically dental illnesses-as-lived,
would allow more meaningful discussion of these dental
pathologies and help us answer the ethical and moral
questions outlined above. As of yet, application of phe-
nomenological analysis to dental illness is extremely
sparse, if not entirely absent.
Phenomenology is a method of philosophical analysis
concerned with the structure and content of human
lived experience instead of asking of what truly exists or,
more generally, the metaphysical constituents of nature.
In essence, it is because we experience things that they
are endowed with meaning and significance qua phe-
nomena. Phenomena appear to a consciousness; mean-
ing is not an inherent property of an object that is
naturally there for us to encounter [22]. Phenomenology
can describe any experience, for example, the experience
of listening to a melody or observing a cat’s movements
[23]. When applied to disease, it emphasises how disease
is experienced, i.e. as illness – how disease appears to us,
and blurs the focus on the inquiry into biological
dysfunction.
As always, it should be noted that the empirical study
of disease is, of course, important and has been ex-
tremely successful in the advancement of medical know-
ledge and responsible for curing many diseases and
saving many lives. The use of phenomenology to study
illness is not designed to replace empirical scientific
investigation into disease and medicine; one must be
mindful of the distinction between medical science and
clinical medicine. Though the naturalistic definition of
disease has been shown to poorly describe dental dis-
eases such as caries and periodontitis, epistemological
naturalism and dental science are to be augmented by
research into the phenomenology of dental illness and
not contested by it. The use of phenomenology in this
debate has been criticised more recently with the crux of
the argument showing that simply a wider take on nat-
uralism provides a holistic and patient-centred view of
disease [24–26]. However, the extant views on what con-
stitutes diseases – from naturalistic to normativistic -
are fundamentally not sufficient for use with the above-
mentioned dental diseases, as outlined above. As such,
phenomenology may help us better understand it.
Discussion of illness, in leiu of disease, takes into ac-
count not only the pathologies – but the entire gamut of
history and context within which it is experienced. This
leads to richer descriptions of the experience of illness
that encompass society, culture and what the experience
of a disease means to a person. Through a phenomeno-
logical lens, toothache from dental decay is not simply
late-stage bacterial advancement through tooth tissue
towards a set of nerve endings causing pain but also a
disruption to eating, to socialising, a jarring reminder of
childhood experiences, anxieties and the length of a
sleepless night, an extra item in the to-do list, an extra
journey after work, a potentially larger hole in the wallet
and impending judgement from friends or family or,
even, from oneself.
Few others have loosely alluded to highlighting the ex-
periencer in dental illness. Hofman and Eriksen, in an
exploration of ethics in dentistry, introduce a concept of
sickness to form a triad of disease, illness and sickness
[27]. Here, various perspectives of the pathology are
considered – that of the physician, society and, import-
antly, the patient themselves – in deciding on whether
or not to treat. They do not discuss phenomenology per
se but acknowledge that the ‘illness’ part of the triad has
‘ethical primacy’; it is the patient’s experience that is the
most important factor in dental ethics [27]. This is
echoed in more recent explorations into the phenomen-
ology of illness:
‘[ … ] illness is the most important element of the
disease-illness coupling. We care about physiological
dysfunction primarily when it causes us pain or
discomfort, or prevents us from doing certain things’
[8]. [emphasis added]
Phenomenology’s use in providing a framework for
philosophically understanding illness has gained great
traction but it is not entirely clear that we can simply
use the same phenomenological research in the discus-
sion of those who have diagnoses of dental caries and
periodontitis, given that they are so different and poorly
described by classical medical definitions of disease. For
example, dental caries is common, preventable and mon-
itorable; the great majority of us know how to avoid it
and why it happens. This knowledge itself may change
the experience of the illness. If we experience dental ill-
ness when we have consciously made avoidable decisions
that have led to it, do we experience them similarly to
those rarer illnesses that we cannot expect, e.g. a diagno-
sis of pancreatic cancer? It might even be the case that
precisely because dental caries is so preventable, its ill-
ness experience may initially be lined with notions of
failure and lack of self-discipline. It would be exceed-
ingly counterintuitive to suggest one might have a simi-
lar self-judgement of failure-to-prevent when diagnosed
with a genetic condition such as Huntington’s. Does pre-
vention of illness, as a whole, warrent its own phenom-
enological analysis? As alluded to in the previous
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section, these differences in the illness experience may
be shared with other illnesses that have similar central
characteristics, for example T2DM, but through phe-
nomenology, any similarities or differences that are un-
covered within a spectrum of illnesses may even inform
our discussion of disease and its management instead of
function to belittle the pathology as normal or not
worthy of treatment.
Carel has shown how having a thorough phenomeno-
logical understanding of illness can provide us with
insight into how we interact, manage, and treat disease
and, indeed, human experience [8, 28]. This approach
leads to more holistic medicine and, in the case of dental
caries and periodontitis, alleviates the pressure for a firm
definition of these diseases. If we can apply phenomen-
ology to these dental illnesses, we may be able to further
expand the usefulness of phenomenology in wider ill-
ness. Further work to assess how dental illness might
align with or deviate from current phenomenological
frameworks must be done before we can comfortably
begin exploring the phenomenology of these dental
illnesses.
Conclusion
Despite having similar past origins and contemporary
methods of practice, it is not sensible to assume that the
disciplines of medicine and dentistry are similar enough
such that an analysis into the subject matter of one is
interchangeable with the other. This article first outlined
how dental caries and periodontitis differ in fundamental
ways to many other medical diseases, by expounding the
most popular schools of thought in defining disease –
the naturalist and normativist – and showing that they
poorly encompass these dental diseases. By being almost
ubiquitous, preventable and hyper-monitorable, it aligns
poorly with the concept of deviation from a reference
class and with notions of being unlucky. Discussion of
how dental caries and periodontitis might only be exam-
ples of a gamut of diseases that share these similar char-
acteristics followed, highlighting T2DM, smoking-related
diseases, some sexually-transmitted diseases, acne, ec-
zema and various forms of allergy.
How can we meaningfully discuss the treatment and
experience of dental caries and periodontitis if it is dis-
puted that they can be classed as diseases? Ethical deci-
sions can only be made about when, why and how to
treat various diseases if all can agree that these are dis-
eases. The final section of the article outlined the phe-
nomenological method and showed how it can give us
another mode of conceptualising disease as it is lived; as
illness. Though not designed to replace philosophical
definitions of disease (such as naturalism or normati-
vism), phenomenology allows us to have a meaningful
discourse about dental illness, where we could discuss
the experience of a illness and the effect it might have on
a person’s life, for example, the disruptions and anxieties
that it may cause. This, in turn, informs and aids a prac-
titioner to manage patients and their illnesses in an eth-
ical manner.
However, for the same reason that some of the charac-
teristics of these dental diseases preclude them being
well described using the classical medical models, these
same differences are likely to change – or at least modu-
late – how dental illness is experienced. Society, medi-
cine, culture, habits and knowledge are intimately linked
with how these differing characteristics of dental disease
affect dental illness as they appear to consciousness. The
example of preventative knowledge and aspects of felt
failure was given. It is unclear that the extant phenom-
enological frameworks of illness will simply apply to
dentistry without modification. As such, we concluded
with suggestions for further work into how dental illness
might interact with current phenomenological frame-
works in the hope of starting a debate in which the phe-
nomenology is applied to the dental sphere.
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